Author Description

This is an extremely impressive and comprehensive late 2018 report. Based on historical lessons learned from irregular warfare case studies, and internal organizational analysis, this thesis seeks to provide Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with specific implementable recommendations based on Edward Luttwak's concept of relational maneuver. Luttwak defines relational maneuver as a style of warfare that requires a deep understanding of the threat and its operational environment to identify vulnerabilities, adapt, and exploit those weaknesses to destroy the enemy as a system. Luttwak argues that irregular warfare requires effective implementation of relational maneuver to achieve operational and strategic success. The U.S. military's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2009 through 2016 have revealed insufficient use of relational maneuver, favoring, instead, employment of attrition warfare, which focuses on optimizing internal organizational efficiency without understanding, or adapting to, the threat or the operational environment. Through this research, the authors seek to influence MARSOC's organizational strategy to more effectively wage irregular warfare. The final recommendations provide a possible path to MARSOC for overcoming institutional challenges inhibiting the employment of relational maneuver in irregular warfare.I. Introduction * II. Relational Maneuver: An Analytical Framework * III. Case Study: Vietnam, An Ineffective Evolution Toward Relational Maneuver * IV. El Salvador: "Not A Military War" * V. Afghanistan: "Still A Question Mark" * VI. SOF Advantages-Introduction * VII. Organizational Design and MARSOC * VIII. Synthesis, Analysis, And Recommendations * IX. Discoveries, Disclaimers, and Further Research * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat AssessmentThe evidence suggests that the root of the U.S. military's strategic failures in irregular warfare lies in ineffective implementation of what modern strategist Edward Lut