Author Description

General Abrams presents a sound historical example of the practical application of operational art as viewed through the lens of the Army Design Methodology. When General Abrams' assumed command of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), he was able to frame his environment enabling him to enact measures to solve the correct problem which was, how to equip and train the ARVN while simultaneously focusing on population centric efforts in counterinsurgency-ultimately eliminating the need for U.S. presence in Vietnam. Under his authority, American forces were broken up into small units that would live with and train the South Vietnamese civilians to defend their villages from guerrilla or conventional Northern incursions. Not only did he successfully frame the problem in 1968 but he was able to re-frame in 1970 in accordance with the Nixon administration's abrupt announcement of a rapid withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. These efforts proved successful as evidenced by the ability of ARVN forces to repel a full-scale NVA Easter Offensive in 1972. This study validates the Army Design Methodology as a framework for the assessment operational art. Section I - Background * Section II - Abrams Takes Over: MACV from 1968 to 1970 * Section III - Vietnamization: A Reframing Moment * Section IV - MACV from 1970 to 1972: Proof of Principle The Vietnam War represents a prime example of how tactical actions, when not properly linked to strategic and political objectives, can have little to no effect on the success of any military endeavor. The undertakings of the civilian and military leadership in the early years of the war demonstrated the negative effects of non-existent operational art as evidenced by the state of affairs following the Tet Offensive in 1968. Operational art requires leaders that demonstrate a sound awareness and understanding of their environment as well as the ability to synchronize tactical assets and activities, in time and space, to achieve a strategic