Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 2016 Annual Report A key part of improving a system is objectively measuring its performance and the effects of policies, processes, and inputs on the outcomes of the system. Without this, we cannot tell where we have problems, what is working (or not), and whether management changes are making things better (or worse). In the case of defense acquisition, the primary outcome is the value of operational capabilities delivered in time for our warfighters to address threats. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure the final operational performance and value of our systems across systems and commodities. Our reports can objectively measure and thus focus on the cost, schedule, and technical performance of our acquisitions-aggregated to look for statistically significant trends together with correlates, institutional differences, and theory to inform ways to improve future outcomes. Each performance measure has its strengths and weaknesses, so we use multiple measures (e.g., at both the program and contract level) and subsequent analysis to see if the answers point in the same direction. We add experience and theoretical insights to guide our conclusions. This is the fourth annual report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, using quantitative analysis of broad data to measure institutional performance. This annual report series is a central part of Better Buying Power (BBP). It continues to reflect results in defense acquisition performance from ongoing DoD compliance with the Improve Acquisition Act of 2010 and the earlier Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Although similarly motivated, our efforts go beyond the specifics of those laws to seek additional insights for improving the defense acquisition system's performance. This study also fulfills ongoing Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requests for evidence-based analytic studies on acquisition performance. It is encouraging to see e