Author Description

A nuclear conflict between the superpowers is more likely to arise from the loss of control during a crisis than from a premeditated decision to embark on war. Yet governments and the public continue to focus on the size and shape of nuclear arsenals rather than on the ability of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to prevent an altercation from escalating into nuclear combat. In this book, Desmond Ball, Paul Bracken, General Lloyd R. Leavitt, and numerous other political, military, and technical experts propose a variety of measures to enhance "crisis stability"--the ability to retain control over events in a grave crisis.The result of a study sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Cornell University's Peace Studies Program that pooled many of the best minds on nuclear weapons, the book examines the development of today's complex "command and control" systems. "The two superpowers' command and control structures should be thought of as a single interacting system composed of men and machines," write Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair, who integrated the study group's papers. They examine the mounting strains that would be placed on this system as a confrontation intensified to the point where the command system itself was under attack. To portray the dramatic transformation brought about by the introduction of nuclear weapons and other post-1945 technical developments, they trace the evolution of command systems from Napoleon to the present day. Also included are analyses of the major post-Hiroshima crises and the military and intelligence operations the superpowers are likely to mount in future crises, as well as a hypothetical Mid-East crisis scenario illustrating the dangers of nuclear proliferation.In conclusion, the book projects the impact on crisis stability of new and forthcoming technologies, such as cruise missiles and anti-satellite weapons, and propose specific policy recommendations on which the U.S. government can act, both alone and in conjunction with the Soviet Union.