Author Description

The end of the Cold War, the acceleration of globalization, and “the rise of the rest” posed serious challenges to the existing international order based on World War II settlements and Cold War modifications. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 provided an opportunity to address this problem, as evidenced by the emergence of the G20 at the leadership level, but this adjustment, reflecting a sea change in international economic and political realities, was by no means a smooth process. Domestically, in many advanced industrial countries, there was a populist/nativist backlash as increasing socioeconomic disparities and interaction with the outside world produced economic anxiety and status anxiety. Politicians who promised to take back control appealed to a large number of voters, using “us vs. them” rhetoric to divert attention from socioeconomic inequality. Thus, even before the outbreak of COVID-19, the combination of international power shift and populist/nativist backlash made global cooperation a precarious proposition, even though the proliferation of global value chains, climate change, and infectious diseases made global cooperation more imperative than ever before. The pandemic has accelerated the pre-existing trends of increasing inequality at home and decreasing inequality among countries, especially U.S.-China competition. It is evident that these accelerating trends cannot lead to stable outcomes, as they exacerbate the risks of crisis and conflict if they continue. This book explores how domestic and international transformation can address these problems. Domestically, instead of blaming “the global elite” and “outsiders,” investing in people should receive priority, given the challenges of automation and globalization. Unless workers and the middle class feel secure enough, governments would find it difficult to push for international initiatives. Internationally, a new order should reflect changing economic and political realities, with gu