Author Description

This thesis is intended as a defense of some of the main structural features of utilitarianism. It does not mount this defense ex nihilo. It begins with the framework set out in Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics and related writings. It builds on this framework in a way that is faithful to Sidgwick's aims.Sidgwick recognizes that a normative theory requires epistemic justification. He develops a foundationalism to justify utilitarianism. This is controversial. Many think (following John Rawls) that he espouses a coherentist version of reflective equilibrium; others think he adopts a version with elements of both foundationalism and coherentism.The upshot of the thesis is that the most plausible intuitions give us reason to believe that utilitarianism is correct. I conclude with some discussion of the nature of the intuitions I defend.In chapter III I demonstrate the way in which Sidgwick's epistemology is bound up with his case for utilitarianism. There I articulate the precise nature of his intuitions and his case for utilitarianism. Sidgwick does not attempt a proper defense against critics. I attempt to remedy this in chapters IV, V and VI.In chapters I & II, I defend my interpretation. In chapter II, I defend Sidgwick's foundationalism against pure coherentism. I raise some worries about but do not fully refute the second version of reflective equilibrium. Instead, I argue that since both it and the foundationalism that I defend accept that there are non-derivatively justified propositions, they are united in seeking out (a) the most appropriate intuitions and (b) the methods by which they can be corrected. Sidgwick's methods for correcting intuitions are agreeable to most. I employ them to show that the most appropriate starting points in ethics are a set of abstract intuitions.Chapter IV defends Sidgwick's conception of universality. This version states that: if it is judged wrong for X to do A to Y then it cannot be judged right for Y to do A to X simply because they are two different individuals and without there being a reasonable ground for differentiation between them. I argue that Sidgwick's intuitionist defense of utilitarianism builds on the requirements of universality by specifying what constitutes a reasonable ground for differentiation in treatment.Chapter V defends the claim that the time at which something happens is not directly or intrinsically relevant to its value. I argue that a plausible rendering of the requirement aids us in overcoming objections. Chapter VI defends several elements of utilitarianism, the agent-neutrality of value, a maximizing conception of rationality and the idea that the correct stance toward the good is one of promotion. I show that rival views are either flawed or absorbed by a maximizing agent-neutral consequentialism.