This book highlights that an independent judiciary is indispensable for the very existence of any society based on democratic values, such as the observance of the rule of law and respect for the human rights of individuals. In order to ensure that the judiciary’s interpretation of the law is not bound by the will of the executive and that it is able to call the executive to account by protecting the life as well as liberty of the governed, it is imperative to guarantee, among other things, a transparent method of appointment and the security of tenure of the judges. Taking into account the importance of an independent judiciary in a democratic society, the framers of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, following in the footsteps of the framers of the Constitutions of India and Pakistan, incorporated in the Constitution the ideal of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary as one of its basic features. This book, however, makes it manifestly evident that the key elements for realising such an ideal have not adequately been guaranteed by the Constitution. Consequently, this book sheds light on how succeeding generations of executives have sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Accordingly, this book puts forward recommendations for the insertion of detailed norms in the Constitution of Bangladesh for establishing the best means for excluding patronage appointments to the bench and for guaranteeing the security of tenure of the judges. This book asserts that the incorporation of such norms, safeguards the independence of the superior judiciary to decide cases without fear or favour. This book, therefore, seeks to address the gap that exists between the theory and practice concerning the independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh. Since no book is currently available in the market that critically examines these issues in a systematic and structured manner, this research enhances knowledge by not only identifying the flaws,deficien