Author Description

The Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice offers a comprehensive and authoritative guide to the interdisciplinary field that bridges economics, political science, and philosophy. With contributions from leading scholars around the globe, this volume explores how incentives, institutions, and individual behavior shape collective decision-making in democratic and non-democratic contexts alike. Covering foundational concepts such as constitutionalism, rational ignorance, rent-seeking, the median voter, and Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Encyclopedia also delves into contemporary debates on algorithmic fairness, authoritarian populism, expressive choice, and the role of emotion in politics. It brings public choice theory to bear on issues ranging from corruption, fiscal federalism, and globalization, to political dynasties, constitutional design, and the decline of democracy, and documents the unique insights of the approach. From classical models of strategic voting and collective action to emergent perspectives on behavioral asymmetries and belief consumption, this Encyclopedia illuminates the enduring relevance of public choice in understanding the mechanics of governance, power, policy, and political change. Essential reading for researchers, students, and practitioners, this is the definitive reference for anyone seeking to understand the logic--and limits--of political decision-making. Key Features: A diverse range of international experts Examines how economics and politics influence each other in real-world settings Provides forward-thinking insights into political behavior, corruption, election cycles and policy-making