Author Description

Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 are filled with surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including hundreds of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, military historian Lewis Sorley has given us what has long been needed - an insightful, factual, and documented history of these important years. Sorley demonstrates that dramatic changes occurred in nearly every aspect of the U.S. approach to the war. General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top military post, joining Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and, before long, Ambassador William Colby in forming a capable and like-minded leadership team. The three shared the belief that the conflict must be approached as "one war" in which combat operations, pacification, and improvement of South Vietnam's forces were given equal emphasis and importance. Large-scale "search and destroy" sweeps gave way to "clear and hold" operations. Security for the people in the hamlets and villages replaced attrition of enemy forces as the primary objective, and "body count" disappeared as the measure of merit. The result was a dramatic improvement in the military, economic, and political life of South Vietnam, despite the progressive withdrawal of U.S. forces during these later years. The strategy of Abrams, Colby, and Bunker came very close to achieving the elusive goal of a free and independent South Vietnam.