Author Description

"The enemy of my enemy," as the age-old axiom goes, "is my friend." Such was the reasoning behind U.S. strategy when the Reagan administration first tilted towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. This same thinking continued and even deepened during the Bush administration up to the very eve of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait - when the enemy of my enemy proved that he still could be my enemy, too. This thoughtful and well-documented analysis of U.S.-Iraqi relations confronts such questions as how and why the Reagan-Bush strategy of bringing Saddam into the family of nations failed so profoundly. Why didn't Iraq moderate its behavior? Why didn't the United States increase its influence? Might the whole Gulf War have been avoided? These questions push beyond the revelations of the "Iraq-gate" scandal to get at the most fundamental flaws in the Reagan-Bush strategy. Irrespective of the military success in the Gulf War which followed, there are important lessons to be learned about why the war occurred - foreign policy lessons that must be understood as the United States charts its course in the post-Cold War world. Drawing on scores of declassified documents, revealing interviews, hearings held by the U.S. Congress, and many other sources, Professor Bruce Jentleson provides a richly detailed and insightful account of the politics, processes and consequences of U.S. policy towards Iraq in these crucial years. The miscalculations, misunderstandings, and mismanagements will provoke and fascinate all serious observers of U.S. foreign policy.