Author Description

The author examines the extent to which the United Kingdom (UK) has transitioned to effects-based operations to ascertain: (1) Areas where the U.S. Army could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) Areas where the U.S. Army and the British Ministry of Defence could develop integrated or complementary approaches and doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/coalition operations; and (3) Implications for the U.S. Army for working with the UK. This monograph is subdivided into four parts. Section 1 is a review of the evolution of British defence policy since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an effects based approach. Section 2 examines the British operational experience since the end of the Cold War including an analysis of the lessons learned and its experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses the UK's capability development through its doctrine and acquisition strategies. Section 4 evaluates the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army and makes 17 main recommendations.