Author Description

How did China move swiftly in capital-intensive industries without labor-cost or scale advantage from bit player to largest manufacturer and exporter? This book argues that industrial subsidies contributed significantly. Economic theories have portrayed subsidies as distortive, inefficiently reallocating resources according to non-market criteria. However, China's state-capitalist regime uses subsidies to promote the governments' and the Communist Party of China's interests. Rather than aberrations, subsidies help Chinese businesses, central and provincial governments produce, stabilize and create common understandings of markets. Concepts of state capitalism include market-transition theory, the multi-organizational Chinese state, and state as paramount shareholder. The authors measure subsidies using publicly-reported data at firm and industry levels from governmental and private sources. Subsidies include free to low-cost loans, subsidies to energy (coal, electricity, natural gas, heavy oil) and to key inputs, land and technology. Four sequential studies identify the growth and effects of subsidies to Chinese manufacturing over time: steel (2000-2007), glass (2004-2008), paper (2002-2009) and auto parts (2001-2011). Subsidies to Chinese industry affect and are affected by business strategy and trade policy. Business strategies include lobbying for subsidies and protection from subsidized foreign competitors, and managing supply chains to guard against whiplash effects of uncoordinated subsidies. The solar industry highlights how decisions on production location and technology development respond to production or consumption subsidies and include market (competitive) and non-market (political) strategies. The book also covers government policies and regulation on subsidies broadly focusing on domestic consumption (antidumping and countervailing duties) and domestic production (indigenous innovation).