Drawing On Recently Declassified Documents And Extensive Interviews With Soviet And American Policy-makers, Among Them Several Important Figures Speaking For Public Record For The First Time, Ned Lebow And Janice Stein Cast New Light On The Effect Of Nuclear Threats In Two Of The Tensest Moments Of The Cold War: The Cuban Missile Crisis Of 1962 And The Confrontations Arising Out Of The Arab-israeli War Of 1973. They Conclude That The Strategy Of Deterrence Prolonged Rather Than Ended The Conflict Between The Superpowers. Front Matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One Introduction -- Part One: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 -- Chapter Two. Missiles To Cuba: Foreign-policy Motives -- Chapter Three. Missiles To Cuba: Domestic Politics -- Chapter Four. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- Chapter Five. Why Did The Missiles Provoke A Crisis? -- Chapter Six. The Crisis And Its Resolution -- Part Two: The Crisis In The Middle East, October 1973 -- Chapter Seven. The Failure To Prevent War, October 1973 -- Chapter Eight. The Failure To Limit The War: The Soviet And American Airlifts -- Chapter Nine. The Failure To Stop The Fighting -- Chapter Ten. The Failure To Avoid Confrontation -- Chapter Eleven. The Crisis And Its Resolution -- Part Three: Deterrence, Compellence, And The Cold War -- Chapter Twelve. How Crises Are Resolved -- Chapter Thirteen. Deterrence And Crisis Management -- Chapter Fourteen. Nuclear Threats And Nuclear Weapons -- Postscript: Deterrence And The End Of The Cold War -- Notes -- Appendix -- Name Index -- General Index Richard Ned Lebow And Janice Gross Stein. Description Based Upon Print Version Of Record. Includes Bibliograhical References (p. [377]-521) And Indexes. English