Author Description

A seminal case in corporate law (Dodge v. Ford Motor Co), set the cardinal principle that corporations must serve the interests of shareholders rather than the interests of employees, customers, or the community. This principle, referred to as "shareholder primacy," has been considered a tenet of the fiduciary duty owed by corporate directors. The shareholder primacy norm has influenced corporate behavior and encouraged short-term profit-seeking behavior with significant social ramifications. Corporations have been criticized for undermining the interests of employees, customers, and the community in the name of profit maximization. Shareholder Primacy as an Untenable Corporate Norm argues that corporate interests and broader social interests, such as benefits to consumers and employees, are not mutually exclusive and can be reconciled by allowing corporate managers and majority shareholders to define corporate interests more broadly, beyond the narrow confines of shareholder primacy. This monograph examines the flaws of shareholder primacy as the principle for corporate governance and discuss an alternative approach (the stakeholder approach). It also discusses the necessity of a statutory adjustment and propose legal reform to clarify the current ambiguity about the legal status of shareholder primacy.