Author Description

Whether or not a person has a positive duty to prevent harm is both a complex and fundamental question in English tort law. There is a distinction drawn between doing harm and failing to prevent it, between acts and omissions. However, there are instances in which a failure to act can have legal consequences. Omissions in Tort Law analyses the justification for the lack of a general positive duty to prevent harm and argues that it is not best understood in terms of the distinction between acts and omissions, but in terms of making things worse versus not making things better. It considers when the law will and should impose duties to improve another's position. It provides novel conceptual analyses of the basic concepts that inform the imposition of positive duties, such as creation of risk, interfering with aid, assuming responsibility, controlling a source of risk, and the normative considerations that underpin them. In addition, it addresses the ways in which the law differentiates between actively causing harm and failing to protect from harm, and makes recommendations as to how the law could be improved. Exploring the ways in which conceptions of morality intersect with legal obligations, Omissions in Tort Law offers a detailed and nuanced perspective on omissions and positive duties, including scope, justification, and potential areas for change.