Author Description

In 1798 the possibility of attacks upon British India by Afghanistan and France led to the first consideration of a suitable system of distant defence for that continent. Until 1838 Britain's favoured strategy made Iran the main buffer state, but disappointment with the Iranian alliance led Britain to investigate the possibilities of a system based on Afghanistan which led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839. the collapse of the Afghan strategy in 1842 led to concentration on strengthening the British-Indian frontier itself, through the annexation of Sind and in 1849, of the Punjab.Using a large selection of official and private papers, Dr. Yapp surveys the perception of dangers to British India, the discussion of appropriate defensive strategies, the implementation of programmes of action, and the recasting of plans in the light of experience at all levels, from the Cabinet to the frontier agent. His main theme is the nature of strategy itself; is it a disposition of resources to deal with a real problem, or a device for the satisfaction of diverse interests? he challenges accepted theories of the importance of the defence of British Indian in the formulation of British foreign policy, and asserts that the priorities of Britain and British India were very different, and that strategy of defence against the distant enemy of British India was mainly a convenient mode of achieving the semblance, but not the reality of unity in British foreign policy.