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Excerpt from The Physics of Idealism: A Thesis Presented to the University Faculty of Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In discussing the attitude of idealism towards the metaphysics of natural science one is embarrassed at the outset by the indefiniteness of the term idealism. Systems which are called idealistic differ radically in character, as do those of Leibniz and Berkeley. Many of them exhibit features which are supposed to be characteristic of realism. Yet the distinction between realism and idealism is a time-honored one, and cannot be without significance. It is therefore important to determine with some precision in what this distinction consists. Two criteria often used to make the distinction appear to the writer to be of very inferior value. According to one, an idealist is a thinker who denies that the external world and the objects of knowledge possess a reality independent of the perception or thought by which they form a part of his consciousness. Their esse is percipi, and in addition to their reality as perception no sort of existence can be ascribed to them. The realist, on the other hand, urges that things exist by themselves, and that afterwards a knowing mind may happen to perceive them - or it may not, the incident being of no great significance. There is no doubt much excuse for resting the distinction upon the denial of an objective world independent of consciousness. The general contention of idealism, both in England and Germany, has been that the reality of the object consists in nothing else than being perceived. Except as related to consciousness, it is urged, no meaning can be ascribed to objectivity. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the wo