Author Description

From Executive Summary: The financial crisis and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis have revealed serious problems in the architecture of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). As a major step towards resolving these problems and creating an EMU architecture better able to ensure stability and prosperity gains from closer European economic union, the European Council has proposed an overhaul of the current EMU, broadly outlined in its report "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union". A key aspect which has been underscored is the further involvement of democratic institutions - notably the European Parliament - not only in the legislative process but also as part of a new, enhanced system of oversight to complement the new executive powers which form an essential part of a better functioning EMU. This paper sets out issues related to systems of financial supervision, drawing on existing practices in the member states and monetary policy in different European countries. Several trends can be distinguished which could be useful in terms of improving supervision at EU level. Firstly, there is now broad recognition that a monetary policy regime works best when the Central Bank is closely involved in prudential financial supervision. Secondly, in cases where financial conduct and consumer interests are protected under the aegis of the same supervisory authority, the need for democratic accountability and oversight is evident, because ultimately it is the State, and its taxpayers, who must back up the potential losses of a failed bank.