Author Description

"This book examines to what extent the right of self-defence, as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, permits States to launch military operations against other States. In particular, it focuses on the occurrence of an 'armed attack' - the crucial trigger for the activation of this right. In light of the developments since 9/11, the author analyses relevant physical and verbal customary practice, ranging from the 1974 Definition of Aggression to recent incidents such as the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan and the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The notion of 'armed attack' is examined from a threefold perspective. What acts can be regarded as an 'armed attack'? When can an 'armed attack' be considered to take place? And from whom must an 'armed attack' emanate? By way of conclusion, the different findings are brought together in a draft 'Definition of Armed Attack'"-- "On June 27, 1986, the International Court of Justice pronounced its much-anticipated judgment in the Nicaragua case. For the first time in its history, it gave a direct and elaborate ruling on issues pertaining to the international law on the use of force (Ius ad Bellum), including on the conditions for the exercise of States' right of self-defence. If the Court's approach merits praise for unequivocally affirming that disputes involving the recourse to force are inherently justiciable, it is somewhat puzzling what led the Hague Judges to conclude that "[t]here appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks", triggering the right of self-defence. Whether it was naivety, overconfidence or bluff on their part is open to speculation, yet one need not possess the combined legal skills of Grotius and Vattel to understand that it did not completely reflect normative reality"--