Author Description

This Element reconstructs Kant's puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect (Achtung), which is 'a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different' from all common feelings (4:401n.). The focus is on the systematic position of respect within the framework of Kant's major works and within the faculties of the human mind. The concept of respect is discussed with regard to (i) the transcendental problem of noumenal causation in Kant's first Critique; (ii) the practical problem of moral motivation in Kant's second Critique; (iii) the aesthetic problem of feeling and the dynamic sublime in Kant's third Critique; and (iv) the problem of moral imputability and education in Kant's Religion and Metaphysics of Morals. By considering its self-reflective volitional structure, this Element argues for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true.