The Philosophical Problem Of Identity And The Related Problem Of Change Go Back To The Ancient Greek Philosophers And Fascinated Later Figures Including Leibniz, Locke, And Hume. Heraclitus Argued That One Could Not Swim In The Same River Twice Because New Waters Were Ever Flowing In. When Is A River Not The Same River? If One Removes One Plank At A Time When Is A Ship No Longer A Ship? What Is The Basic Nature Of Identity And Persistence? In This Book, The Author Introduces And Assesses The Philosophical Puzzles Posed By Things Persisting Through Time. Beginning With Essential Historical Background To The Problem He Explores The Following Key Topics And Debates: Mereology And Identity, Including Arguments From 'leibniz's Law'; The Constitution View Of Identity; The 'relative Identity' Argument Concerning Identity; Temporary Identity; Four-dimensionalism, Conterpart And Multiple Counterpart Theory; Supervenience; The Problem Of Temporary Intrinsics; The Necessity Of Identity; Indeterminate Identity; Presentism; Criteria Of Identity; Conventionalism About Identity. Including Chapter Summaries, Annotated Further Reading And A Glossary, This Book Is Essential Reading For Anyone Seeking A Clear And Informative Introduction To And Assessment Of The Metaphysics Of Identity.-- Machine Generated Contents Note: 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Topic Of The Book: Problems Of Persistence -- 1.2. Three Views About Persistence -- 1.3. Conventionalism About Identity -- 1.4. Relative Identity -- 1.5. Leibniz's Law (the Indiscernibility Of Identicals) -- 1.6. Perdurantist Solution To Identity Puzzles -- 1.7. Criteria Of Identity -- 1.8. Outline Of Book -- Further Reading -- 2. Historical Background -- 2.1. Ancient Greeks On The Problems Of Change And Persistence, From The Presocratics To Aristotle -- 2.2. Stoics And Academic Skeptics -- 2.3. Medievals -- 2.4. Early Modern Philosophers -- 2.5. Locke On Material Object And Personal Identity -- 2.6. Locke's Critics: Butler And Reid -- 2.7. Hume On Our Belief In Persistence -- Summary -- Further Reading -- 3. Puzzles Of Persistence -- 3.1. Leibniz's Law -- 3.1.1. Leibniz's Law, The Identity Of Indescernibles, And Substitutivity -- 3.2. Restricting Leibniz's Law -- 3.2.1. To Time-restricted Properties -- 3.2.2. To World-restricted (modal) Properties -- 3.3. Leibniz's Law Arguments -- 3.4. Common Pattern -- 3.4.1. Temporal Version -- 3.4.2. Modal Version -- 3.5. 1001 Cats -- 3.6. Alternative Diagnosis -- 3.7. Options For Solving The Puzzle Cases -- 3.8. Personal Identity -- Summary -- Further Reading -- 4. Endurantist Solutions To The Puzzle Cases: Part 1 -- 4.1. Constitution And Identity -- 4.2. Defining Constitution -- 4.2.1. Baker's Definition -- 4.2.2. Objection To Baker -- 4.3. Alternative Definitions Of Constitution -- 4.3.1. Simons And Doepke -- 4.3.2. Judith Jarvis Thomson -- 4.4. Does Constitution Help? -- 4.5. Objections To Constitution -- 4.5.1. Too Many Minds -- 4.5.2. Objections From Grounding And Causation -- 4.6. Shared Parts -- 4.7. One Thinger Views -- 4.7.1. Burke On Dominant Sortals -- 4.7.2. Van Inwagen On Arbitrary Undetached Parts -- 4.7.3. Chisholm On Identity Strict And Loose -- Summary -- Further Reading -- 5. Endurantist Solutions To The Puzzle Cases: Part 2 -- 5.1. Relative Identity -- 5.1.1. What It Is -- 5.1.2. How Much Does It Help With The Puzzle Cases? -- 5.1.3. Relative Identity And Leibniz's Law -- 5.2. Indeterminate Identity -- 5.2.1. Appealing To Indeterminacy -- 5.2.2. Evans' Argument -- 5.3. Closest Continuer Theory -- 5.3.1. Closest Continuer Theory And The Necessity Of Identity -- 5.3.2. Modal Argument: How Cogent Is It? -- 5.4. Temporary And Contingent Identity -- 5.4.1. Gibbard's View -- 5.4.2. Alternative Account -- 5.4.3. Mereological Nihilism -- Summary -- Further Reading -- 6. Four-dimensional World -- 6.1. Four-dimensionalism -- 6.1.1. Four-dimensionalism And Some Theses About Time -- 6.1.2. Perdurantist Solution -- 6.2. Three Arguments For Four-dimensionalism -- 6.2.1. Temporary Intrinsics -- 6.2.2. Constructing Perdurants: Humean Supervenience -- 6.2.3. Vagueness: Sider's Argument -- 6.2.4. Exotica -- 6.2.5. Delia Rocca's Objection To Endurantism -- 6.3. Arguments Against Four-dimensionalism -- 6.3.1. Geach And Thomson -- 6.3.2. No Real Change Objection -- 6.3.3. Could A Perdurer Have Lasted For A Different Time? -- 6.3.4. Supervenience Revisited -- 6.3.5. Sattig's Argument -- 6.4. Stage View -- 6.5. Are Perdurantism And Endurantism Equivalent? -- 6.6. Is The Dispute Ill Defined? -- Summary -- Further Reading -- 7. Identity Criteria, Conventionalism, And The Problem Of Change -- 7.1. Identity Criteria -- 7.1.1. Identity Criteria: What They Are And What They Are Not -- 7.1.2. Are There Any? -- 7.2. Conventionalism -- 7.2.1. Why Conventionalism? -- 7.2.2. Conventionalism And Four-dimensionalism -- 7.3. Hirsch's View -- 7.4. Heller's Conventionalism -- 7.5. Restricting Leibniz's Law -- 7.5.1. Myro's Proposal -- 7.5.2. Baxter's Proposal -- 7.6. Is There A Problem Of Change? -- Summary -- Further Reading. André Gallois. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.