Author Description

This thesis examines how experts operate in the political arena. To do so, it proceeds with a case study of American telecommunications policy at the federal level, focusing on the adoption of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The first set of research questions relates to the issue of recognition. How do experts become legitimate providers of policy advice? What are the criteria for selection? The second set of questions relates to the power of experts. Can expert proposals influence policymaking? Through which paths and mechanisms can their proposals be incorporated in the policy process? Two strategies available to experts to gain recognition are identified: professionalization and boundary-work. In the case study, professionalization is not sufficient to explain the competition between economists and lawyers to be recognized as the relevant source of advice on telecommunications policy. It is boundary work that allows economists to be recognized as the best source of advice in this field. Indeed, lawyers have a stronger professional position than economists, but economists are able to carve out a jurisdiction based on the notion of economic efficiency. This research also identifies what criteria are used by policymakers to select experts, by examining who was invited to appear at congressional hearings leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The main criteria are: (1) formal credentials (2) experience in federal agencies and (3) views supportive of policymakers' positions. This latter criterion highlights the role of legitimization played by experts in policymaking. Regarding the issue of influence, the case study confirms that expert advice rarely has a direct impact on the specific content of a new policy. The influence of economists is not on policy formulation; the primary erect is during the setting of the political agenda and even before. Economists changed the policy paradigm for the regulation of telecommunications. Their knowledge first gained