Author Description

This Book Develops A Model That Explains How And Why Interethnic Bargains Between Rival Groups Can Erode Given Different Institutional Configurations. It Is Hypothesized That Interethnic Conflict Is More Likely In Countries Where Political Institutions Fail To Insulate The Political Hegemony Of Traditionally Dominant Ethnic Communities And Redistributive Programs Fail To Improve The Economic Position Of Ethnic Majorities. In Such Cases, Outbidding Strategies By More Extreme Ethnic Leaders Are More Successful And Violence Becomes More Likely. This Book Will Be Of Interest To Students Of Ethnic Conflict, Asian Politics, And Security Studies.--book Jacket. Ethnic Identity, Economic Power, And Conflict -- Ethnic Mythologies And Formal Institutions -- A Theory Of Conflict And Cooperation In Counterbalanced States -- Fiji: A Nationalist Iceberg In The South Pacific -- Of Ballots And Tall Grass: Malaysia's Quasi-democracy And Ethnic Relations -- South Africa: Rainbow Nation In Zimbabwe's Shadow. Brian Shoup. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [174]-180) And Index.