Intro -- Halftitle Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- List Of Contributors -- 1. Some Reflections On Causation -- 1. Recent Debates Over Causation -- 2. Alternative Approaches: Beyond Difference-making And Mechanism -- 3. A Practice Turn (and Towards A Functional Approach?) -- 2. Causation: A Non-reductionist, Theoretical-term Analysis -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Thought Experiment And The Core Idea: Principles Linking Causation To Logical Probability -- 3. The Postulates For A Theoretical-term Analysis Of The Concept Of The Relation Of Causation 4. Defining The Relation Of Causation -- 5. Some Highly Desirable Aspects Of This Account Of The Relation Of Causation -- 6. The Alternatives To A Non-reductionist Analysis Of Causation -- 7. Some Central Objections To Humean Reductionist Analyses -- 8. The Fundamental Objection To A Non-humean Reductionist Analysis -- 9. A Refutation Of The Simplest Non-reductionist View -- 10. Logical Probability And The Epistemological Problem Of Laws Of Nature -- 11. Summing Up -- 3. Robust Causal Realism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. How Do We Come By Our Grasp Of Causal Relations? 3. The Ontology Of Causal Relations: Preliminaries -- 4. Knowledge Of How The World Works -- 5. The Ontology Of Necessary Causal Connection -- 6. Back To Epistemology: Knowledge Of The World -- 7. Some Concluding Reflections -- 4. The Metaphysics Of Causation: An Empiricist Critique -- 1. Overview -- 2. The Dilemma -- 3. First Horn: The Failed Quest For Factual Content -- 4. The Second Horn: Causal Metaphysics Is Not Factual -- 5. Causation Is Not Factual Discovery, But Convenient Definition -- 6. The Manipulability Or Interventionist Conception Of Causation 7. Solving Problems For The Interventionist Account -- 8. Downward Causation -- 9. Causal Maxims Are Reawakened -- 10. Conclusion -- 5. A Dispositional Account Of Causation: Implications For The Biological Sciences -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Two-event Model Of Causation As A Philosophical Bias -- 3. Implications For Biology: The Problem Of Low External Validity -- 4. Diagnosis Of The Problem_ A Humean Methodology -- 5. Causal Dispositionalism -- 6. Methodological Implications -- 6. Causal Efficacy: A Comparison Of Rival Views -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Transmission Accounts 3. Mechanistic Accounts -- 4. Powers-based Accounts -- 5. Influence: Unidirectional Or Reciprocal? -- 6. Powerful Particulars Account -- 7. Case Study I: Collisions Between Billiard Balls -- 8. Case Study Ii: Water Dissolving Salt -- 9. Conclusion -- 7. The Metaphysics And Epistemology Of Causal Production: The Prospects Of Variation To Trace The Transmission Of Information -- 1. Why Bother With Causal Production? -- 2. Information Transmission As A Thin General Metaphysics For Causal Production -- 3. Tracing Transmission: Why Production Needs Variation -- 4. Discussion And Conclusion Edited By Yafeng Shan. Also Issued In Print: 2024. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.