Cover; Oxford Studies In Agency And Responsibility: Volume 6; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; List Of Contributors; Introduction To Osar 6; 1: Control, Attitudes, And Accountability; 1.1 The First Horn: Deny Direct Accountability For Our Reasons-responsive Attitudes; 1.2 The Second Horn: Deny The Necessity Of Control For Accountability; 1.3 The Third Horn: Deny That The Relevant Sort Of Control Is Volitional Control; 1.4 Conclusion; References; 2: Self-control And Moral Security; Introduction; 2.1 Self-control; 2.1.1 Strategies And Techniques Of Self-control 2.1.2 Diachronic Self-control And Mental Time Travel2.1.3 Agency And Self-control; 2.1.4 Self-control, Diachronic Agency, And Flourishing Lives; 2.1.5 Self-control Undermined; 2.2 Moral Security And Moral Injury; 2.2.1 Moral Security Undermined; 2.3 Race, Moral Security, And Self-control; 2.3.1 Respectability Politics And The Demand For Self-control; 2.3.2 The Impact Of Respectability Politics On Self-control; 2.3.3 Whose Self-control Matters?; 2.4 Poverty, Moral Security, And Self-control; 2.4.1 Poverty And Self-control; 2.4.1.a The Demand For Self-control And The Expectation Of Gratitude 2.4.1.b Poverty, Willpower, And Strategies Of Self-control2.4.1.c Possibility, Identity And Normative Self-control; 2.5 Conclusion; Bibliography; 3: (en)joining Others; References; 4: Who's Afraid Of A Little Resentment?; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Strawsonian Methodology; 4.3 The Argument From Moral Sanction; 4.4 The Argument From Communication; 4.5 Conclusion: Further Reflections On Methodology; References; 5: Shame And Attributability; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Accountability And Control; 5.3 Attributability And Self-blame; 5.4 Attributability And Shame; 5.5 Fitting Shame 5.6 Fittingness And Desert5.7 Deserved Guilt, Fitting Shame, And Control; 5.8 Concluding Remarks; Acknowledgements; References; 6: The Minimal Approval Account Of Attributability; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Motivation For The Project; A. The Appeal Of Deep Self Views; B. Failure To Locate A Necessary Condition On Attributability; 6.3 The Account; A. Partial Endorsement; B. Hypothetical Versus Explicit Endorsement; C. Approval: Endorsement With A Further Aim Than Elimination; 6.4 Advantages Of The View; A. Capacity Without Process B. Criterion Operates Independently Of The Type Of Mental State That Causes Action6.5 Conclusion; References; 7: Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Do False Moral Views Exculpate?; 7.3 Objection: My Opponent Can Agree That Carl, Dawn, And George Are Blameless; 7.4 Can Moral Testimony Provide Moral Knowledge?; 7.5 The Worry: A Tension Between My Two Answers; 7.6 My Proposed Solution To The Worry: Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far; 7.7 Objections To My Proposed Solution; 7.8 Conclusion; References; 8: Contemporary Neuroscience's Epiphenomenal Challenge To Responsibility; 8.1 Edited By David Shoemaker. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.