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Cover -- The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- The Open Future: Introduction To A Classical Approach -- 1: Grounding The Open Future -- 1.1 Truth And Reality -- 1.2 The Problem Of The Past -- 1.3 The Future In Particular -- 1.4 Conclusion -- 2: Three Models Of The Undetermined Future -- 2.1 Three Models -- 2.2 Future Directed Facts -- 2.3 The Thin Red Line -- 2.4 Semantics For Will -- 2.5 A Comparison: Cows In Barns -- 2.6 Model (iii) Once More -- 2.7 Peirceanism -- 2.8 All False -- 2.9 A Flow-chart -- 2.10 Objection: Missing Ambiguities? 2.11 Costs And Benefits: A Preliminary Take -- 3: The Open Future, Classical Style -- 3.1 Scopelessness -- 3.2 Neg-raising: A Primer -- 3.3 Interlude: Pure Semantic Competence -- 3.4 Against Scopelessness: Quantifiers -- 3.5 One Or The Other/neither -- 3.6 A Prediction Of Salience -- 3.7 The Dialectic: Circular Arguments -- 3.8 Some Comparisons With Other Modals -- 3.9 Some Objections -- 3.10 Interim Conclusion -- 3.11 Supervaluationism: A Comparison -- 3.12 The Past And The Future: A Comparison -- 3.13 No Fact Of The Matter? -- 4: The Will/would Connection -- 4.1 Grounding 4.2 Williamson On Conditional Excluded Middle -- 4.3 A Brief Interlude On Might Arguments -- 4.4 Models And Semantics Once More -- 4.5 Flow-charts -- 4.6 The Neg-raising Inference -- 4.7 On An Argument For Cem From Quantifiers -- 4.8 Should -- 4.9 Conclusion -- 5: Omniscience And The Future -- 5.1 Two Versions Of Open Theism: Open Future, And Limited Foreknowledge -- 5.2 The Logic Of Omniscience -- 5.3 Perfect Anticipation: Variations On A Priorean Theme -- 5.4 God's Tickets -- 5.5 From Omni-accuracy To Omni-correctness -- 5.6 Shifting Gears -- 6: Betting On The Open Future 6.1 Prior On Bets, Guesses, And Predictions -- 6.2 Betting As A Normative Act -- 6.3 Promising -- 6.4 Open-futurist Agreements -- 6.5 Ambiguities -- 6.6 Omniscience -- 6.7 Transition To The Credence Problem -- 6.8 The First Problem: Zero Credence -- 6.9 Moore-paradoxes? -- 6.10 The Second Problem: The Linguistic Data -- 6.11 The Will/would Connection Once More -- 6.12 Probability In Fiction -- 6.13 Unifying The Three Cases -- 6.14 Conclusion -- 7: Future Contingents And The Logic Of Temporal Omniscience -- 7.1 Open-closurism -- 7.2 The Logic Of Temporal Omniscience 7.3 The Costs Of Omni-accuracy -- 7.4 The Costs Of Omni-correctness -- 7.5 Ruling Out Omniscience? -- 7.6 Revoking Omniscience -- 7.7 Conclusion -- Appendix: Denying Retro-closure -- 8: The Assertion Problem -- 8.1 The First Problem: Must Open Futurists Change Their Ways? -- 8.2 Another Assertion Problem -- 8.3 Asserting What Is False, But Communicating What Is True -- 8.4 Weakened Readings -- 8.5 Tendencies And The Future -- 8.6 Interlude On Skepticism -- 8.7 Inshallah -- 8.8 Conclusion -- References -- Index Patrick Todd. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.