Is Morality Fixed Objectively, Independently Of All Human Judgment, Or Do We Invent Right And Wrong? Articulating The Moral Community Argues That Neither Of These Simple Answers Is Correct. Its Central Thesis Is That, Working Within Zones Of Objective Indeterminacy, The Moral Community-the Community Of All Persons-has The Authority To Introduce New Moral Norms. 0unlike Political Communities, Which Are Centralized, Non-inclusive, And Backed By Coercion, The Moral Community Is Decentralized, Inclusive, And Not Coercively Backed. This Book Explains In Detail How Its Structure Arises From Efforts By Individuals To Work Out Intelligently With One Another How To Respond To Morally Important Concerns. Developing A Novel Theory Of Dyadic Rights And Duties Based On This Phenomenon, The Book Argues That Conscientious Efforts Of This Kind Provide Moral Input, Authoritative Only Over The Parties Involved. After Sufficient Uptake And Reflective Acceptance By The Moral Community, However, These Innovations Become New Moral Norms.0this Account Of The Moral Community's Moral Authority Is Motivated By, And Supports, A Type Of Normative Ethical Theory, Constructive Ethical Pragmatism, Which-to Use An Unfashionable Distinction Defended In The Book-rejects The Consequentialist Claim That Rightness Is To Be Defined As A Function Of Goodness And The Deontological Claim That Principles Of Right Stand Fixed, Independently Of The Good. It Holds, Rather, That What We Ought To Do Depends On Our Continuing Efforts To Specify The Right And The Good In Light Of Each Other. 1.1 The Universality Of The Moral Community P. 4 -- 1.2 Illustrative Examples Of Decentered Moral Innovation P. 9 -- 1.3 The Possibility Of Indeterminacy-reducing Moral Progress P. 13 -- 1.4 Basic Conditions On How New Moral Norms Can Be Socially Introduced P. 21 -- 1.5 Preview Of The Argument P. 27 -- 1 Constructive Ethical Pragmatism P. 31 -- 1.1 Characterizing Constructive Ethical Pragmatism P. 31 -- 1.2 Moral Theory As Having A Practical Role P. 41 -- 1.3 The Flexibility Of Constructive Ethical Pragmatism P. 48 -- 1.4 Constructive Ethical Pragmatism Will Guide Deliberation Better P. 56 -- Part 2 Th Moral Authority Of The Moral Community -- 2 The Idea Of The Moral Community P. 63 -- 2.1 Ways Of Modeling The Moral Community P. 64 -- 2.2 Kant On The Ethical Community P. 69 -- 2.3 Norms To Structure The Moral Community P. 73 -- 2.4 The Unity Of The Universal Moral Community: Thompson's Challenge P. 75 -- 3 Authoritative Input: Dyadic Duties And Rights P. 85 -- 3.1 The Specificatory Theory Of Dyadic Moral Rights And Duties P. 85 -- 3.2 Rival Theories Of Dyadic Rights And Duties? P. 89 -- 3.3 Addressing Human Rights P. 93 -- 3.4 Generalizing The Account To Include Transactional Duties And Private Rights P. 98 -- 3.5 From Specific Address To The Specificatory Theory Of Dyadic Rights And Duties P. 105 -- 3.6 Objections To The Specificatory Theory P. 111 -- 3.7 The Specificatory Theory Compared To The Will Theory P. 114 -- 3.8 The Input Stage P. 115 -- 4 The Unity Of The Moral Community P. 118 -- 4.1 Bringing Intelligent Beings Together Under One System Of Norms P. 120 -- 4.2 Effacing The Boundaries Between Distinct Practices P. 121 -- 4.3 Knitting Together Morally Disagreeing Communities P. 124 -- 4.4 Looking Beyond Individual Human Nature To The Social P. 126 -- 4.5 Beyond Interacting Intelligent Beings P. 129 -- 4.6 How All Persons Can Be United In A Single Moral Community P. 133 -- 5 Introducing New Moral Norms P. 135 -- 5.1 Selection And Convergence P. 137 -- 5.2 The Very Idea Of Moral Authority P. 142 -- 5.3 The Moral Community's Authority Respects Autonomy P. 145 -- 5.4 New Moral Norms P. 149 -- 5.5 New Objective Norms P. 152 -- 6 Working It Out Together: Joint Moral Reasoning P. 154 -- 6.1 Why A New Account Of Jointly Embodied Moral Reasoning Is Needed P. 157 -- 6.2 Generality, Inclusiveness, And Deference To Authority P. 165 -- 6.3 A Model Of Embodied, Joint Moral Reasoning P. 169 -- 7 Ratification Of New Moral Norms P. 176 -- 7.1 Mutual Recognition Of Acceptance P. 177 -- 7.2 The Problem Of Future Persons P. 184 -- 7.3 Baclcward-looking Awareness P. 187 -- 7.4 Reasoning In The Ratification Stage P. 189 -- 7.5 Ratification: Summing Up P. 191 -- Part 3 Defending And Extending The Account -- 8 Reasons, Indeterminacy, And Compromise P. 195 -- 8.1 The Appeal Of The Set Of First-order Reasons P. 196 -- 8.2 The Moral-psychological Objection P. 201 -- 8.3 Reasoning In Terms Of Ends P. 205 -- 8.4 The Role Of Commitments P. 211 -- 8.5 Compromise: Working Things Out Together P. 212 -- 8.6 Reasons And Reasoning P. 216 -- 9 Noneternal Moral Principles P. 218 -- 9.1 Cudworth's Essentialist Argument For Moral Rationalism P. 219 -- 9.2 Cohen's Argument Against Fact-sensitive Principles P. 226 -- 9.3 Working With Moral Principles In Medias Res P. 235 -- 10 Objectivity And Path-dependence P. 238 -- 10.1 A Working Conception Of Moral Objectivity P. 241 -- 10.2 Objectivity In The Introduction Of New Moral Norms P. 245 -- 10.3 Path-dependence P. 247 -- 10.4 Retrospective Moral Judgment P. 250 -- 10.5 Taint By Actual Injustice And Corruption P. 256. Henry S. Richardson. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.