During The Past Few Decades, A Radical Shift Has Occurred In How Philosophers Conceive Of The Relation Between Science And Philosophy. A Great Number Of Analytic Philosophers Have Adopted What Is Commonly Called A Naturalistic Approach, Arguing That Their Inquiries Ought To Be In Some Sense Continuous With Science. Where Early Analytic Philosophers Often Relied On A Sharp Distinction Between Science And Philosophy—the Former An Empirical Discipline Concerned With Fact, The Latter An A Priori Discipline Concerned With Meaning—philosophers Today Largely Follow Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) In His Seminal Rejection Of This Distinction. 1.2 Naturalism And Analytic Philosophy P. 4 -- 1.3 Working From Within P. 6 -- 1.4 Reading Quine In Historical Context P. 8 -- 1.5 Plan P. 10 -- Part I Nature -- 2 Naturalizing Epistemology P. 15 -- 2.2 From Certainty To Straight Psychology P. 18 -- 2.3 Two Strategies P. 24 -- 2.4 Self-sufficient Sensory Languages P. 26 -- 2.5 Quine's Response To The Skeptic P. 30 -- 2.6 Reinterpreting Epistemology Naturalized P. 32 -- 3 Naturalizing Metaphysics P. 36 -- 3.2 Internal And External Existence Claims P. 39 -- 3.3 Two Distinctions P. 42 -- 3.4 Quine On Metaphysical Existence Claims P. 46 -- 3.5 Scientific Sense And Metaphysical Nonsense P. 50 -- 4 In Mediis Rebus P. 54 -- 4.2 Three Commitments P. 56 -- 4.3 A Quirk Of Usage P. 62 -- 4.4 Deflation, Deflation, Deflation P. 66 -- 4.5 The Bounds Of Science P. 69 -- 4.6 Immanence And Transcendence P. 71 -- 4.7 Artificial Languages P. 74 -- Part Ii Development -- 5 Sign And Object P. 79 -- 5.2 Philosophical Background P. 81 -- 5.3 Starting At The Middle P. 84 -- 5.4 The Nature Of Metaphysical Judgments P. 85 -- 5.5 A Pragmatic Interpretation Of Positivism P. 88 -- 5.6 The Philosopher's Task P. 90 -- 5.7 Two Problems P. 93 -- 5.8 Two Dogmas P. 96 -- 5.9 Language And Knowledge P. 100 -- 6 Analytic And Synthetic P. 103 -- 6.2 Early Developments P. 106 -- 6.2.1 Narrow And Wide Holism P. 106 -- 6.2.2 Mathematical Objects And Mathematical Knowledge P. 111 -- 6.2.3 The Principle Of Tolerance P. 114 -- 6.2.4 A Behavioristically Acceptable Definition P. 116 -- 6.2.5 Triangular Correspondence P. 120 -- 6.2.6 Quine On Asemiotism P. 122 -- 6.3 After Two Dogmas P. 125 -- 6.3.1 The Whole Of Science P. 127 -- 6.3.2 Maximal Integration P. 129 -- 6.3.3 Universal Revisability P. 132 -- 6.3.4 Maximal Inclusion P. 136 -- 7 Science And Philosophy P. 141 -- 7.2 Ordinary Language And The Language Of Science P. 142 -- 7.3 Philosophy And Science; Science And Philosophy P. 147 -- 7.4 The Reception Of Quine's Naturalism P. 151 -- 7.5 Adopting An Ism P. 155. Sander Verhaegh. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.