Introduction : What This Book Aims To Achieve (and What It Doesn't). A Map -- Some Key Terminology And Distinctions. The Prospects For An Analysis Of Emotions In Terms Of Other Intentional States -- Part I. Emotions As Pleasures And Distresses -- Emotions As Representational Hedonic States -- Pleasure And Distress As Contributing To The Individuation Of Emotion-types -- Emotions As Hedonic States That Are Formed In Response To Intentional States That Apprehend Their Objects -- Emotions And The Account(s) Of Pleasure In The Ethics -- Part Ii. Emotions And Desires -- Anger (orgē) -- Some Other (putative) Links Between Emotions And Desires -- Appetite (epithumia) -- Part Iii. The Material Dimension Of Emotions And Some Problematic Cases -- The Material Or Bodily Dimension Of Emotions -- Some Problematic Cases And The Supplements In The Ee Specification Of The Emotions -- Part Iv. Further Philosophical Considerations And A Significant Philosophical Advantage -- Contrast With A Contemporary Motivational Theory. Which Representational Role(s) Do Emotions Play? -- Explaining Recalcitrant Emotions With Aristotle -- Catalogue Of Aristotle's Emotions As Representational Pleasures Or Distresses. Giles Pearson. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.