Cover -- Trade Policy In Multilevel Government: Organizing Openness -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List Of Figures -- List Of Tables -- List Of Abbreviations -- 1: Introduction: The Rise Of Multilevel Trade Governance -- Theoretical Argument And Contribution -- The Case Of Procurement Liberalization -- Findings -- Book Outline -- 2: More Voice, Less Exit: The Dynamics Of Multilevel Trade Governance -- 2.1 Federalism, Multilevel Government, And The European Union -- 2.2 The Dynamic Nature Of Multilevel Government -- 2.3 Voice And Exit In Multilevel Trade Governance The Inverse Relationship Between Constituent Units' Voice And Exit -- Voice In Different Varieties Of Multilevel Government -- Voice In The Council And Senate Varieties Of Multilevel Government -- Voice In Collaborative And Competitive Vertical Relations -- Market Integration And Politicization As Intervening Factors -- 2.4 Case Selection -- 2.5 Method Of Comparison And Empirical Data Base -- Summary -- 3: Resisting Openness: Subcentral Governments And Procurement Liberalization -- 3.1 The Significance Of Public Procurement In Multilevel Government 3.2 The Emergence Of An International Regime On Public Procurement -- The Procurement Regime's Historical Foundations -- The Regime's Continuous Entrenchment In Recent Decades -- 3.3 Varying Subcentral Openness To Multilevel Procurement Liberalization -- Comparatively Low Openness In The United States -- 1946-88: Pursuing The Creation Of An International Regime -- 1989-95: Expanding Gpa Coverage To States -- 1996-2017: States' Ebbing Desire For Procurement Liberalization -- 1964-2009: Provincial Resistance To The Plurilateral Regime -- 2010-17: Canada As A Driver Of Procurement Liberalization Comparatively High Openness In The European Union -- 1964-85: Cautious Position During The Tokyo Round -- 1986-95: Offensive Stance During The Uruguay Round -- 1996-2017: Expanding Disciplines In And Beyond The Gpa -- Summary -- 4: United States: The Limits Of Self-rule -- 4.1 The Us Senate Model In Trade Governance -- Federal And State Powers In Trade Policy -- The Market Participant Exception And Pre-emption -- Implicit Pre-emption: The Irrevocability Of State Commitments -- The States' Role In Trade Policy-making -- The Ustr's Voluntary Opt-in Mechanism In Procurement 4.2 Sectoral Competition Between The States And Washington -- 'coercive Cooperation' In The Us Federation -- Vertical Relations On Trade And Procurement Policy -- Dysfunctional Vertical Coordination In Igpac -- Distrust Between The States And Washington -- 4.3 Fragmentation In The Domestic Market -- 4.4 Episodes Of Subcentral Politicization -- Summary -- 5: Canada: Less Centralization, More Integration -- 5.1 The Canadian Senate Model In Trade Governance -- Federal And Provincial Powers In Trade Policy -- Evolving Jurisdiction And The Provincial 'right To Intervene' Christian Freudlsperger. The Role Of Central-level Actors In Trade Policy-making Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Oxford Available Via World Wide Web.